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Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that probabilis-
tic entailment under coherence is weaker than
model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. More-
over, probabilistic entailment under coherence
is a generalization of default entailment in Sys-
tem P . In this paper, we continue this line of
research by presenting probabilistic generaliza-
tions of more sophisticated notions of classi-
cal default entailment that lie between model-
theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilis-
tic entailment under coherence. That is, the
new formalisms properly generalize their coun-
terparts in classical default reasoning, they are
weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entail-
ment, and they are stronger than probabilistic en-
tailment under coherence. The new formalisms
are useful especially for handling probabilistic
inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero
events. They can also be applied for probabilistic
belief revision. More generally, in the same spirit
as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light
on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic rea-
soning beyond the well-known standard ones.
1 Introduction
In the recent decades, probabilistic reasoning has become
an important research topic in artificial intelligence. In par-
ticular, extensive research has been carried out on proba-
bilistic reasoning with interval restrictions for conditional
probabilities, also called conditional constraints [40].
One important approach for handling conditional con-
straints is model-theoretic probabilistic logic, which comes
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especially from philosophy and logic, and whose roots go
back to Boole’s book of 1854 “The Laws of Thought”
[11]. There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that
have been explored in model-theoretic probabilistic logic,
ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional
events [16, 20, 2, 53, 19, 23, 33, 45, 39, 40, 42, 46] to rich
languages that specify linear inequalities over events [22].
The main problems related to model-theoretic probabilis-
tic logic are checking satisfiability, deciding logical conse-
quence, and computing tight logically entailed intervals.
Another important approach to probabilistic reasoning with
conditional constraints, which has been extensively ex-
plored in the area of statistics, is based on the coherence
principle of de Finetti and suitable generalizations of it
[8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 27, 28, 29, 50], or on similar princi-
ples that have been adopted for lower and upper probabil-
ities [49, 54]. Two important aspects of dealing with un-
certainty in this framework are (i) checking the consistency
of a probabilistic assessment, and (ii) the propagation of a
given assessment to further uncertain quantities.
Recently, the relationship between model-theoretic proba-
bilistic logic and probabilistic logic under coherence has
been thoroughly explored in [10]. In particular, it turned
out that probabilistic entailment under coherence is weaker
than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover,
it has been shown in [10] that probabilistic entailment un-
der coherence is a generalization of classical default en-
tailment in System P , while model-theoretic probabilistic
entailment is well-known to be a generalization of model-
theoretic entailment in classical propositional logics.
In this paper, we continue this line of research by present-
ing probabilistic generalizations of more sophisticated for-
malisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge
bases, which lie between probabilistic entailment under co-
herence and model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. That
is, the new notions of entailment generalize their classical
counterparts, they are stronger than entailment under co-
herence, and weaker than model-theoretic entailment.
The literature contains several different proposals for de-
fault reasoning from conditional knowledge bases and ex-
tensive work on its desired properties. The core of these
properties are the rationality postulates of System P pro-
posed by Kraus et al. [34]. It turned out that these ratio-
nality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom
system for several classical model-theoretic entailment re-
lations under uncertainty measures on worlds. In detail,
they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment un-
der preferential structures [51, 34], infinitesimal probabil-
ities [1, 47], possibility measures [17], and world rank-
ings [52, 31]. They also characterize an entailment relation
based on conditional objects [18]. A survey of all these
relationships is given in [6, 24].
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, the
notion of rational closure as a more adventurous notion
of entailment was introduced by Lehmann [36, 38]. It is
equivalent to entailment in System Z by Pearl [48], to the
least specific possibility entailment by Benferhat et al. [5],
and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by
Lamarre [35]. Finally, mainly to solve problems with prop-
erty inheritance from classes to exceptional subclasses, the
maximum entropy approach to default entailment was pro-
posed by Goldszmidt et al. [30]; lexicographic entailment
was introduced by Lehmann [37] and Benferhat et al. [4];
conditional entailment was proposed by Geffner [25, 26];
and an infinitesimal belief function approach was suggested
by Benferhat et al. [7].
In this paper, we define probabilistic generalizations of en-
tailment in Pearl’s System Z and Lehmann’s lexicographic
entailment that lie between entailment in model-theoretic
probabilistic logic and entailment in probabilistic logic un-
der coherence. Roughly speaking, the main difference be-
tween model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and proba-
bilistic entailment under coherence is that the former real-
izes an inheritance of logical knowledge, while the latter
does not. Intuitively, the new formalisms now add a strat-
egy for resolving inconsistencies to model-theoretic prob-
abilistic logic, and a restricted form of inheritance of logi-
cal knowledge to probabilistic logic under coherence. This
is why the new notions of entailment are weaker than en-
tailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic and stronger
than entailment in probabilistic logic under coherence.
Hence, the new formalisms are refinements of both model-
theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entail-
ment under coherence. They can be used in place of model-
theoretic probabilistic entailment, when we want to resolve
probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero
events. Here, the new formalisms are especially well-suited
as they coincide with model-theoretic probabilistic entail-
ment as long as we condition on non-zero events. Further-
more, the new formalisms can be used in place of proba-
bilistic entailment under coherence, when we also want to
have an inheritance of logical knowledge. Finally, another
important application is probabilistic belief revision.
A companion paper [44] presents similar probabilistic gen-
eralizations of entailment in Pearl’s System Z and of Leh-
mann’s lexicographic entailment. These formalisms, how-
ever, are quite different from the ones in this paper. In de-
tail, the new formalisms in [44] add an inheritance of prob-
abilistic knowledge and a strategy for resolving inconsis-
tencies to entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic.
For this reason, they are generally much stronger than en-
tailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. Thus, they
are especially useful where the classical notion of model-
theoretic entailment is too weak, for example, in proba-
bilistic logic programming [42, 41]. Other applications are
deriving degrees of belief from statistical knowledge and
degrees of belief, handling inconsistencies in probabilistic
knowledge bases, and probabilistic belief revision.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-
coherent entailment in probabilistic logic under coherence
can be expressed in terms of probability rankings.
• We present new probabilistic generalizations of entail-
ment in Pearl’s System Z and Lehmann’s lexicographic en-
tailment, which lie between model-theoretic probabilistic
entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence.
• We analyze and compare some general nonmonotonic
properties of the new notions of entailment, of model-
theoretic probabilistic entailment, and of probabilistic en-
tailment under coherence. In particular, it turns out that the
new formalisms satisfy the properties of Rational Mono-
tonicity and Irrelevance, while probabilistic entailment un-
der coherence is lacking these properties.
• We analyze the relationship between the new notion of
entailment in System Z , the new notion of lexicographic
entailment, model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and
probabilistic entailment under coherence.
• We show that the new notions of entailment in Sys-
tem Z and of lexicographic entailment are proper gener-
alizations of their classical counterparts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives some technical preliminaries. In Section 3, we show
that probabilistic reasoning under coherence can be ex-
pressed in terms of probability rankings, and we introduce
the new probabilistic notions of entailment in System Z
and of lexicographic entailment. Section 4 concentrates on
the properties of the new formalisms and of the standard
ones. In Section 5, we summarize the main results and give
an outlook on future research. Note that detailed proofs of
all results are given in the extended paper [43].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first define probabilistic knowledge
bases. We then recall the notions of satisfiability and of
logical entailment from model-theoretic probabilistic logic,
and the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entail-
ment from probabilistic logic under coherence.
2.1 Probabilistic Knowledge Bases
We assume a set of basic events Φ= {p1, . . . , pn} with
n≥ 1. We use ⊥ and ⊤ to denote false and true, respec-
tively. We define events by induction as follows. Every
element of Φ∪{⊥,⊤} is an event. If φ and ψ are events,
then also¬φ and (φ∧ψ). A logical constraint is an event of
the formψ⇐φ. A conditional event is an expression of the
form ψ|φ with events ψ and φ. A conditional constraint is
an expression of the form (ψ|φ)[l, u] with events ψ, φ, and
real numbers l, u∈ [0, 1]. We define probabilistic formu-
las by induction as follows. Every conditional constraint is
a probabilistic formula. If F and G are probabilistic for-
mulas, then also ¬F and (F ∧ G). We use (F ∨G) and
(F ⇐G) to abbreviate ¬(¬F ∧¬G) and ¬(¬F ∧G), re-
spectively, where F and G are either two events or two
probabilistic formulas. We adopt the usual conventions
to eliminate parentheses.
A world I is a truth assignment to the basic events
in Φ (that is, a mapping I : Φ → {true, false}), which
is inductively extended to all events by I(⊥)= false,
I(⊤)= true, I(¬φ)= true iff I(φ) = false, and I((φ ∧
ψ))= true iff I(φ)= I(ψ)= true. We use IΦ to de-
note the set of all worlds for Φ. A world I satisfies
an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |=φ, iff
I(φ)= true. We extend worlds I to conditional events
ψ|φ by I(ψ|φ)= true iff I |=ψ ∧φ, I(ψ|φ)= false
iff I |=¬ψ ∧φ, and I(ψ|φ)= indeterminate iff I |=¬φ.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability func-
tion on IΦ (that is, a mapping Pr : IΦ → [0, 1] such that
all Pr(I) with I ∈IΦ sum up to 1). The probability of
an event φ in the probabilistic interpretation Pr , denoted
Pr(φ), is the sum of all Pr(I) such that I ∈IΦ and I |=φ.
For events φ and ψ with Pr(φ)> 0, we write Pr (ψ|φ) to
abbreviate Pr (ψ ∧ φ) /Pr(φ). The truth of logical con-
straints and probabilistic formulas F in a probabilistic in-
terpretation Pr , denoted Pr |= F , is defined as follows:
• Pr |= ψ⇐φ iff Pr (ψ ∧φ) = Pr (φ).
• Pr |= (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)= 0 or Pr(ψ|φ)∈ [l, u].
• Pr |= ¬F iff not Pr |= F .
• Pr |= (F ∧G) iff Pr |= F and Pr |= G.
We say Pr satisfies F , or Pr is a model of F , iff Pr |=F .
We say Pr satisfies a set of logical and conditional con-
straints F , or Pr is a model of F , denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr
is a model of all F ∈F .
A probabilistic knowledge base KB =(L, P ) consists
of a finite set of logical constraints L and a finite set
of conditional constraints P such that (i) l≤ u for all
(ψ|φ)[l, u]∈P , and (ii) ψ1|φ1 6= ψ2|φ2 for any two dis-
tinct (ψ1|φ1)[l1, u1], (ψ2|φ2)[l2, u2]∈P . Note that here
ψ1|φ1 6= ψ2|φ2 iff either ψ1 ∧ φ1 is not logically equiva-
lent to ψ2 ∧ φ2, or φ1 is not logically equivalent to φ2.
Example 2.1 A sample probabilistic knowledge base
KB =(L, P ) is given as follows:
L = {bird⇐ penguin} ,
P = {(have legs | bird)[1, 1], (fly | bird)[1, 1]} .
Here, L represents the logical knowledge “all penguins are
birds”. Moreover, in model-theoretic probabilistic logic,
P expresses the logical knowledge “all birds have legs”
and “all birds fly”, while in probabilistic logic under co-
herence and in the new nonmonotonic logics, P expresses
the default logical knowledge “typically, birds have legs”
and “typically, birds fly”.
Another probabilistic knowledge base KB ′=(L′, P ′) is
given as follows:
L′ = {bird⇐ penguin} ,
P ′ = {(have legs | bird)[1, 1], (fly | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[0, 0.05]} .
In model-theoretic probabilistic logic, the additional con-
ditional constraint (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05] represents the
probabilistic knowledge “at most 5% of all penguins fly”,
while in probabilistic logic under coherence and in the new
nonmonotonic logics, (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05] represents the
default probabilistic knowledge “typically, penguins fly
with a probability of at most 0.05”. ✷
2.2 Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
We now recall the model-theoretic notions of satisfiability
and of logical entailment.
A set of logical and conditional constraints F is satisfiable
iff a model of F exists. A probabilistic knowledge base
KB =(L, P ) is satisfiable iff L∪P is satisfiable.
A conditional constraintC is a logical consequence of a set
of logical and conditional constraints F , denoted F ||=C,
iff every model of F is also a model of C. A conditional
constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight logical consequence of F ,
denoted F||=tight(ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the infimum
(resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all models Pr
of F with Pr(φ)> 0. Note that we define l=1 and u=0,
whenF ||= (φ|⊤)[0, 0]. A conditional constraintC is a log-
ical consequence of a probabilistic knowledge base KB ,
denoted KB ||=C, iff L∪P ||=C. It is a tight logical con-
sequence of KB , denoted KB ||=tightC, iff L∪P ||=tightC.
Example 2.2 The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Ex-
ample 2.1 has the following logical consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[1, 1], (have legs | penguin)[1, 1] .
In fact, all these conditional constraints are even tight logi-
cal consequences of KB .
The probabilistic knowledge base KB ′=(L′, P ′) of Ex-
ample 2.1 has the following tight logical consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[1, 0], (have legs | penguin)[1, 0] .
Here, the empty interval “[1, 0]” in the last two conditional
constraints is due to the fact that the logical property of be-
ing able to fly is inherited from birds to penguins and is
incompatible there with the knowledge that at most 5% of
all penguins are able to fly. Hence, in this example, the no-
tion of logical entailment is too strong, as the desirable tight
conclusions from KB ′ are given by (fly | penguin)[0, 0.05]
and (have legs | penguin)[1, 1], respectively. ✷
2.3 Probabilistic Logic under Coherence
We now recall the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent
entailment. We define them by using some recent charac-
terizations through concepts from default reasoning [10].
We first give some preparative definitions.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr verifies a conditional con-
straint (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)> 0 and Pr |=(ψ|φ)[l, u]. It
falsifies a conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)> 0
and Pr 6|=(ψ|φ)[l, u]. A set of conditional constraints P
tolerates a conditional constraint C under a set of logical
constraints L iff L ∪ P has a model that verifies C. A set
of conditional constraints P is under L in conflict with C
iff no model of L ∪ P verifies C.
A conditional constraint ranking σ on a probabilistic
knowledge base KB =(L, P ) maps each element of P to
a nonnegative integer. It is admissible with KB iff every
P ′⊆P that is under L in conflict with some C ∈P con-
tains a conditional constraint C′ such that σ(C′)<σ(C).
We are now ready to define the concept of g-coherence.
A probabilistic knowledge base KB is g-coherent iff there
exists a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admis-
sible with KB .
We next define the notion of g-coherent entailment.
Let KB =(L, P ) be a g-coherent probabilistic knowl-
edge base, and let (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint.
Then, (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a g-coherent consequence of KB , de-
noted KB ‖∼ g(ψ|φ)[l, u], iff (L, P ∪ {(ψ|φ)[p, p]}) is not
g-coherent for all p∈ [0, l)∪ (u, 1]. We say (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a
tight g-coherent consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ gtight
(ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supre-
mum) of p subject to all g-coherent probabilistic knowl-
edge bases (L, P ∪ {(ψ|φ)[p, p]}).
Example 2.3 The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Ex-
ample 2.1 has the following tight g-coherent consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[0, 1], (have legs | penguin)[0, 1] .
Here, the interval “[0, 1]” in the last two conditional con-
straints is due to the fact that the logical properties of be-
ing able to fly and of having legs are not inherited from
birds to penguins. Thus, in this example, the notion of
g-coherent entailment is too weak, as the desirable tight
conclusions from KB are given by (fly | penguin)[1, 1] and
(have legs | penguin)[1, 1], respectively.
The probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ of Example 2.1 has
the following tight g-coherent consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[0, 0.05], (have legs | penguin)[0, 1] .
Here, the last interval “[0, 1]” is due to the fact that the
logical property of having legs is not inherited from birds
to penguins. Thus, also in this example, g-coherent en-
tailment is too weak, as the desirable tight conclusion
from KB ′ is given by (have legs | penguin)[1, 1]. ✷
3 Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics
In this section, we first show that the notions of g-coherence
and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed in terms of
probability rankings. We then introduce new probabilis-
tic generalizations of Pearl’s entailment in System Z and
of Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment. Observe that the
notion of g-coherent entailment is defined through a set of
probability rankings, while the new notions of entailment
in System Z and of lexicographic entailment are each de-
fined through a unique single probability ranking.
In some sense, the new formalisms are second-order for-
malisms, as probability rankings are closely related to pos-
sibility measures over probabilities and can thus be seen as
uncertainty measures over other uncertainty measures.
3.1 Probability Rankings
We now show that g-coherence and g-coherent entailment
can be defined in terms of admissible probability rankings.
We first give some preparative definitions.
In the sequel, we use α> 0 to abbreviate the probabilis-
tic formula ¬(α|⊤)[0, 0]. A probability ranking κ maps
each probabilistic interpretation on IΦ to a member of
{0, 1, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that κ(Pr )= 0 for at least one in-
terpretation Pr . It is extended to all logical constraints and
probabilistic formulasF as follows. If F is satisfiable, then
κ(F )= min {κ(Pr) |Pr |=F}; otherwise, κ(F )=∞. A
probability ranking κ is admissible with a probabilis-
tic knowledge base KB =(L, P ) iff κ(¬F )=∞ for
all F ∈L and κ(φ> 0)<∞ and κ(φ> 0∧ (ψ|φ)[l, u])<
κ(φ> 0∧¬(ψ|φ)[l, u]) for all (ψ|φ)[l, u]∈P .
The following result shows that g-coherence is equivalent
to the existence of an admissible probability ranking.
Theorem 3.1 Let KB =(L, P ) be a probabilistic knowl-
edge base. Then, KB is g-coherent iff there exists a proba-
bility ranking κ that is admissible with KB .
The next theorem shows that g-coherent entailment can be
expressed in terms of admissible probability rankings.
Theorem 3.2 Let KB =(L, P ) be a g-coherent proba-
bilistic knowledge base, and let (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional
constraint. Then, KB ‖∼ g(ψ|φ)[l, u] iff κ(φ> 0)=∞ or
κ(φ> 0 ∧ (ψ|φ)[l, u]) < κ(φ> 0∧¬(ψ|φ)[l, u]) for every
probability ranking κ that is admissible with KB .
3.2 System Z
We now extend Pearl’s entailment in System Z [48, 32]
to g-coherent probabilistic knowledge bases KB =(L, P ).
The new notion of entailment in System Z is linked to an
ordered partition of P , a conditional constraint ranking z
on KB , and a probability ranking κz .
The z-partition of KB is the unique ordered partition
(P0, . . . , Pk) of P such that each Pi, i∈{0, . . . , k}, is the
set of allC ∈ P−(P0∪· · ·∪Pi−1) that is tolerated underL
by P − (P0 ∪ · · · ∪ Pi−1).
Example 3.3 The z-partition of the probabilistic knowl-
edge base KB =(L, P ) in Example 2.1 is given by:
(P0) = ({(have legs | bird)[1, 1], (fly | bird)[1, 1]}) .
The z-partition of the probabilistic knowledge base
KB
′=(L′, P ′) in Example 2.1 is given as follows:
(P0
′, P1
′) = ({(have legs | bird)[1, 1], (fly | bird)[1, 1]},
{(fly | penguin)[0, 0.05]}) . ✷
We next define the conditional constraint ranking z and
the probability ranking κz . For every j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, each
C ∈Pj is assigned the value j under z. The probability
ranking κz on all probabilistic interpretations Pr is then
defined as follows:
κz(Pr) =


∞ if Pr 6|= L
0 if Pr |= L ∪ P
1 + max
C∈P : Pr 6|=C
z(C) otherwise.
The following lemma shows that, in fact, z is a conditional
constraint ranking on KB that is admissible with KB , and
κz is a probability ranking that is admissible with KB .
Lemma 3.4 Let KB be a g-coherent probabilistic knowl-
edge base. Then,
(a) z is admissible with KB .
(b) κz is admissible with KB .
We next define a preference relation on probabilistic inter-
pretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr
and Pr ′, we say Pr is z-preferable to Pr ′ iff κz(Pr ) <
κz(Pr ′). A model Pr of a set of logical and conditional
constraints F is a z-minimal model of F iff no model of F
is z-preferable to Pr .
We finally define the notion of z-entailment as follows. A
conditional constraint C is a z-consequence of KB , de-
noted KB ‖∼ zC, iff every z-minimal model of L satis-
fies C. A conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight z-
consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ ztight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff
l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ)
subject to all z-minimal models Pr of L with Pr(φ)> 0.
The following example shows that z-entailment realizes
an inheritance of logical properties from classes to non-
exceptional subclasses. However, logical properties are not
inherited from classes to subclasses that are exceptional
with respect to some other property (in classical default
reasoning from conditional knowledge bases, we call this
undesirable feature inheritance blocking).
Example 3.5 The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Ex-
ample 2.1 has the following tight z-consequences:
(fly|bird)[1, 1], (have legs|bird)[1, 1],
(fly|penguin)[1, 1], (have legs|penguin)[1, 1] .
The probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ of Example 2.1 has
the following tight z-consequences:
(fly|bird)[1, 1], (have legs|bird)[1, 1],
(fly|penguin)[0, 0.05], (have legs|penguin)[0, 1] .
Here, the last interval “[0, 1]” is due to the fact that the log-
ical property of having legs is not inherited from birds to
its exceptional subclass penguins. ✷
The following lemma describes an alternative way of defin-
ing the notion of z-consequence.
Lemma 3.6 Let KB be a g-coherent probabilistic knowl-
edge base, and let C =(ψ|φ)[l, u] be a conditional con-
straint. Then, KB ‖∼ zC iff κz(φ> 0)=∞ or κz(φ> 0 ∧
C)<κz(φ> 0∧¬C).
3.3 Lexicographic Entailment
We next extend Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment [37]
to g-coherent probabilistic knowledge bases KB =(L, P ).
Note that even though we do not use probability rankings
here, the new notion of entailment can be easily expressed
by a unique single probability ranking.
We use the z-partition (P0, . . . , Pk) of KB to define a
lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic inter-
pretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations
Pr and Pr ′, we say Pr is lexicographically preferable
(or lex-preferable) to Pr ′ iff some i∈{0, . . . , k} exists
such that |{C∈Pi |Pr |=C}|> |{C∈Pi |Pr ′ |=C}| and
|{C∈Pj |Pr |=C}|= |{C∈Pj |Pr
′ |=C}| for all i<j≤k.
A model Pr of a set of logical and conditional constraints
F is a lexicographically minimal model (or lex-minimal
model) of F iff no model of F is lex-preferable to Pr .
A conditional constraint C is a lex-consequence of KB ,
denoted KB ‖∼ lexC, iff every lex-minimal model of L
satisfies C. A conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight
lex-consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ lextight (ψ|φ)[l, u],
iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ)
subject to all lex-minimal models Pr of L with Pr(φ)> 0.
The following example shows that lex-entailment realizes
a correct inheritance of logical properties. In particular,
it does not show the problem of inheritance blocking.
Example 3.7 The probabilistic knowledge base KB of Ex-
ample 2.1 has the following tight lex-consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[1, 1], (have legs | penguin)[1, 1] .
The probabilistic knowledge base KB ′ of Example 2.1 has
the following tight lex-consequences:
(fly | bird)[1, 1], (have legs | bird)[1, 1],
(fly | penguin)[0, 0.05], (have legs | penguin)[1, 1] . ✷
4 Properties
In this section, we analyze some properties of logical en-
tailment, g-coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-
entailment. We first describe some general nonmonotonic
properties. We then explore the relationship between the
formalisms, and the one to their classical counterparts.
4.1 General Nonmonotonic Properties
We now analyze some general nonmonotonic properties of
the probabilistic formalisms of this paper. It is important to
point out that these properties are especially related to the
inheritance of logical knowledge.
We first consider the postulates Right Weakening (RW), Re-
flexivity (Ref), Left Logical Equivalence (LLE), Cut, Cau-
tious Monotonicity (CM), and Or by Kraus et al. [34],
which are commonly regarded as being particularly de-
sirable for any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic entail-
ment. The following result shows that logical entailment,
g-coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment all
satisfy (probabilistic versions of) these postulates.
Theorem 4.1 ||=, ‖∼ g , ‖∼ z , and ‖∼ lex satisfy the follow-
ing properties for all probabilistic knowledge bases KB =
(L, P ), all events ε, ε′, φ, and ψ, and all l, l′, u, u′ ∈ [0, 1]:
RW. If (φ|⊤)[l, u]⇒ (ψ|⊤)[l′, u′] is logically valid
and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u], then KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l′, u′].
Ref. KB ‖∼ (ε|ε)[1, 1].
LLE. If ε⇔ ε′ is logically valid,
then KB ‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u] iff KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u].
Cut. If KB ‖∼ (ε|ε′)[1, 1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε∧ ε′)[l, u],
then KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u].
CM. If KB ‖∼ (ε|ε′)[1, 1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u],
then KB ‖∼ (φ|ε∧ ε′)[l, u].
Or. If KB ‖∼ (φ|ε)[1, 1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[1, 1],
then KB ‖∼ (φ|ε∨ ε′)[1, 1].
Another desirable property is Rational Monotonicity (RM)
[34], which describes a restricted form of monotony, and
allows to ignore certain kinds of irrelevant knowledge. The
next theorem shows that logical entailment, z-entailment,
and lex-entailment satisfy RM. Here, we use KB 6‖∼C to
denote that it is not the case that KB ‖∼C.
Theorem 4.2 ||=, ‖∼ z , and ‖∼ lex satisfy the follow-
ing property for all probabilistic knowledge bases KB =
(L, P ), all events ε, ε′, and ψ, and all l, u∈ [0, 1]:
||= ‖∼
z ‖∼ g‖∼ lex
Figure 1: Logical Implications between Consequence Relations
RM. If KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε)[1, 1] and KB 6‖∼ (¬ε′|ε)[1, 1],
then KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε∧ ε′)[1, 1].
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment,
however, generally does not satisfy RM.
Example 4.3 Consider the probabilistic knowledge base
KB = (L, P ) = ({bird⇐ eagle}, {(fly | bird)[1, 1]}) .
Then, (fly | bird)[1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., g-
coherent consequence, z-consequence, lex-consequence)
of KB . Moreover, (¬eagle | bird)[1, 1] is not a logical con-
sequence (resp., g-coherent consequence, z-consequence,
lex-consequence) of KB .
Observe now that (fly | bird∧ eagle)[1, 1] is a logical con-
sequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of KB ,
but (fly | bird∧ eagle)[1, 1] is not a g-coherent consequence
of KB . We remark that (fly | bird∧ eagle)[1, 1] is the tight
logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-conse-
quence) of KB , while (fly | bird∧ eagle)[0, 1] is the tight
g-coherent consequence of KB . ✷
We now consider the property Irrelevance (Irr) adapted
from [7]. Informally, Irr says that ε′ is irrelevant to a con-
clusion “P ‖∼ (ψ|ε)[1, 1]” when they are defined over dis-
joint sets of atoms. The following result shows that logical
entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment satisfy Irr.
Theorem 4.4 ||=, ‖∼ z , and ‖∼ lex satisfy the follow-
ing property for all probabilistic knowledge bases KB =
(L, P ) and all events ε, ε′, and ψ:
Irr. If KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε)[1, 1], and no atom of KB and
(ψ|ε)[1, 1] occurs in ε′, then KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε∧ε′)[1, 1].
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment,
however, does not satisfy Irr.
Example 4.5 Consider the probabilistic knowledge base
KB = (L, P ) = (∅, {(fly | bird)[1, 1]}) .
Clearly, (fly | bird)[1, 1] is a logical consequence (resp., g-
coherent consequence, z-consequence, lex-consequence)
of KB . Observe now that (fly | red∧ bird)[1, 1] is a logi-
cal consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence)
of KB , but (fly | red∧ bird)[1, 1] is not a g-coherent con-
sequence of KB . We remark that (fly | red∧ bird)[1, 1] is
the tight logical consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-
consequence) of KB , while (fly | red∧ bird)[0, 1] is the
tight g-coherent consequence of KB . ✷
We finally consider the property Direct Inference (DI)
adapted from [3]. Informally, DI expresses that P should
entail all its own conditional constraints. The following
theorem shows that logical entailment, g-coherent entail-
ment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment all satisfy DI.
Theorem 4.6 ||=, ‖∼ g , ‖∼ z , and ‖∼ lex satisfy the fol-
lowing property for all probabilistic knowledge bases
KB =(L, P ), all events ε, φ, and ψ, and all l, u∈ [0, 1]:
DI. If (ψ|φ)[l, u]∈P and ε⇔φ is logically valid,
then KB ‖∼ (ψ|ε)[l, u].
4.2 Relationship between Probabilistic Formalisms
We now explore the logical implications between the prob-
abilistic formalisms of this paper.
The following theorem shows that the logical implications
illustrated in Fig. 1 hold between logical entailment, g-
coherent entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment.
Theorem 4.7 Let KB =(L, P ) be a g-coherent proba-
bilistic knowledge base, and let C = (ψ|φ)[l, u] be a con-
ditional constraint. Then,
(a) KB ‖∼ gC implies KB ‖∼ zC.
(b) KB ‖∼ zC implies KB ‖∼ lexC.
(c) KB ‖∼ lexC implies KB ||=C.
In general, none of the converse implications holds, as Ex-
amples 2.2, 2.3, 3.5, and 3.7 immediately show. But in the
special case when L∪P has a model in which the con-
ditioning event φ has a positive probability, the notions
of logical entailment, z-entailment, and lex-entailment
of (ψ|φ)[l, u] from KB all coincide. This important result
is expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8 Let KB =(L, P ) be a g-coherent proba-
bilistic knowledge base, and let C =(ψ|φ)[l, u] be a
||= ‖∼
z ‖∼ g‖∼ lex
|∼ lex |∼ z|= |∼
p
Figure 2: Relationship to Classical Formalisms
conditional constraint such that L∪P has a model Pr
with Pr(φ)> 0. Then,
KB ||=C iff KB ‖∼ lexC iff KB ‖∼ zC.
The following example shows that g-coherent entailment,
however, generally does not coincide with logical entail-
ment when L∪P has a model Pr with Pr(φ)> 0.
Example 4.9 Consider again the probabilistic knowledge
base KB = (L, P ) = ({bird⇐ eagle}, {(fly | bird)[1, 1]}).
Then, L∪P has clearly a model Pr with Pr(eagle)> 0.
It is now easy to verify that (fly | eagle)[1, 1] is a logical
consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence) of
KB , but (fly | eagle)[1, 1] is not a g-coherent consequence
of KB . We remark that (fly | eagle)[1, 1] is the tight logi-
cal consequence (resp., z-consequence, lex-consequence)
of KB , while (fly | eagle)[0, 1] is the tight g-coherent con-
sequence of KB . ✷
4.3 Relationship to Classical Formalisms
We now analyze the relationship between the probabilistic
formalisms of this paper and their classical counterparts.
We first give some technical preparation as follows.
The operator γ on conditional constraints, sets of con-
ditional constraints, and conditional knowledge bases re-
places each conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[1, 1] by the classi-
cal defaultψ←φ. We use the expressions |∼ p , |∼ z , |∼ lex ,
and |= to denote the classical notions of entailment in Sys-
tem P , Pearl’s entailment in System Z , Lehmann’s lexico-
graphic entailment, and logical entailment, respectively.
The following well-known result says that logical entail-
ment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic is a generaliza-
tion of logical entailment in classical propositional logic.
Theorem 4.10 Let KB =(L, P ) be a g-coherent prob-
abilistic knowledge base, where P = {(ψ1|φ1)[1, 1], . . . ,
(ψn|φn)[1, 1]}), and let (β|α)[1, 1] be a conditional con-
straint. Then,
KB ||=(β|α)[1, 1] iff γ(KB) |= β⇐α.
The next theorem recalls the recent result by Biazzo et
al. [10] that g-coherent entailment is a generalization of de-
fault entailment in System P .
Theorem 4.11 (Biazzo et al. [10]) Let KB =(L, P ) be a
g-coherent probabilistic knowledge base, where P =
{(ψ1|φ1)[1, 1], . . . , (ψn|φn)[1, 1]}), and let (β|α)[1, 1] be
a conditional constraint. Then,
KB ‖∼ g(β|α)[1, 1] iff γ(KB) |∼ pβ←α.
The following theorem shows that the new notions of
z- and lex-entailment for g-coherent probabilistic knowl-
edge bases generalize their classical counterparts for ε-
consistent conditional knowledge bases.
Theorem 4.12 Let KB = (L, P ) be a g-coherent prob-
abilistic knowledge base, where P = {(ψ1|φ1)[1, 1], . . . ,
(ψn|φn)[1, 1]}), and let (β|α)[1, 1] be a conditional con-
straint. Then,
(a) KB ‖∼ z(β|α)[1, 1] iff γ(KB) |∼ zβ←α.
(b) KB ‖∼ lex (β|α)[1, 1] iff γ(KB) |∼ lexβ←α.
5 Summary and Outlook
We have presented probabilistic generalizations of Pearl’s
entailment in System Z and of Lehmann’s lexicographic
entailment that lie between entailment in model-theoretic
probabilistic logic and entailment in probabilistic logic un-
der coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly gener-
alize their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they
are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment,
and they are stronger than probabilistic entailment under
coherence. The new formalisms are useful especially for
handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to condition-
ing on zero events. Furthermore, they can be applied for
probabilistic belief revision. More generally, in the same
spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light on
exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond
the well-known standard ones.
An interesting topic of future research is to develop algo-
rithms for the new formalisms and to analyze their compu-
tational complexity (along the lines of [44]).
Another very interesting topic of future research is to de-
velop and explore further nonmonotonic formalisms for
reasoning with conditional constraints. Besides extend-
ing classical formalisms for default reasoning from con-
ditional knowledge bases, which may additionally con-
tain a strength assignment to the defaults, one may also
think about combining the new formalisms of this pa-
per and of [44] with some probability selection technique
(as e.g. maximum entropy or center of mass).
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